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This paper examines Miranda Fricker’s method of paradigm-based explanation and in particular its 
promise of yielding an ordered pluralism. Fricker’s starting point is a schism between two 
conceptions of forgiveness, Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness. In the light of a 
hypothesis about the basic point of forgiveness, she reveals the unity underlying the initially baﬄing 
plurality and brings order into it, presenting a paradigmatic form of forgiveness as explanatorily basic 
and other forms as derivative. The resulting picture, she claims, is an ‘explanatorily satisfying ordered 
pluralism.’ But what is this ordered pluralism and how does Fricker’s method deliver it? And to what 
extent can this strategy be generalised to other conceptual practices? By making explicit and critically 
examining the conception of ordered pluralism implicit in Fricker’s procedure, I assess the promise 
that her approach holds as a way of resolving stand-oﬀs between warring conceptions of ideas or 
practices more widely. I argue that it holds great promise in this respect, but that if we are to avoid 
reproducing just the schismatic debates that the pluralism of paradigm-based explanation is 
supposed to overcome at the level of what is to be regarded as a paradigm case, we need to take 
seriously the thought that what counts as a paradigm is partly determined by our purposes in giving 
a paradigm-based explanation.  
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1. Individuation in Terms of Points 
Philosophy is full of enduring schisms or stand-oﬀs between competing conceptions 
of an idea or a practice—conceptions which are often so diﬀerent that it is unclear 
that they are conceptions of the same thing at all. One conception of forgiveness, for 
example, sees forgiveness as necessarily earned; another sees forgiveness as precisely 
not earned, but unconditional or gifted. This gives rise to a puzzle: why should we 
regard such diametrically opposed conceptions as conceptions of one and the same 
phenomenon? 
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 In her ‘Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism’ [Forthcoming], Miranda Fricker aims 
to integrate these two competing conceptions of forgiveness—which she labels 
Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness—into a single conception of an 
internally diverse practice. If conceptions of forgiveness diﬀer, Fricker argues, it is 
because the practice of forgiveness itself takes a plurality of forms. Each conception 
one-sidedly highlights one form and takes it to exhaust the practice, when in reality, 
the practice combines all these forms. But what holds them together? 
 For Fricker, what holds them together is the point they serve. We can achieve an 
‘explanatorily satisfying ordered pluralism’ [Forthcoming: XX], she suggests, by 
individuating the practice of forgiveness in terms of its most basic point, which is 
the unity underlying the initially baﬄing plurality. That plurality can then be 
ordered by seeing one form of forgiveness as paradigmatically serving that point and 
other forms as derivative ways of serving the same overarching point. However 
various the phenomena brought under the heading of ‘forgiveness’ ﬁrst seem, we 
understand what holds them together once we see how (in Hume’s phrase) they 
‘point all to a like end’ [1998: sec. 3.2]. 
 The notion of a point remains somewhat underdetermined, but I take it to mean 
something like the most basic useful diﬀerence the practice makes or aims to make 
in the lives of those who engage in it.1 For Fricker, the most basic point of forgiveness 
is to liberate the forgiver from redundant blame-feeling. Blame-feeling becomes 
redundant once it is clear that it has achieved (or perhaps has no prospect of 
achieving) its point, namely to inspire remorse in the wrongdoer with a view to 
 
1  For a more ﬁne-grained disambiguation of the notion of a ‘point,’ see Queloz 
[Forthcoming]. 
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securing moral alignment.2 (Fricker foregrounds the value of liberating the forgiver 
from redundant blame-feeling, though she recognises the value of liberating the 
wrongdoer from redundant remorse.) Both Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted 
Forgiveness serve this point in diﬀerent ways. Sameness of point is thus the 
plurality’s unifying glue. 
 This contrasts with other ways of individuating conceptual practices, such as 
their individuation in terms of a common core of necessary features, or shared 
causal-historical origins.3 As Fricker notes, her strategy is inspired by the state-of-
nature-based genealogies of Craig [1990] and Williams [2002].4 These genealogies 
provide the key to understanding Fricker’s ordered pluralism. They are 
counterproposals both to the individuation of concepts in terms of a common core 
of necessary conditions and to genealogies which speculatively trace lines of causal 
descent to some distant point of origin. Instead, these genealogies propose to 
formulate, in light of our best understanding of human needs, a functional 
hypothesis about the point of a concept or practice. That hypothesis then guides 
their understanding of what the concept or practice must involve—they let the what 
grow out of the why. Craig’s genealogy, for example, yields an ordered pluralism 
about the concept of knowledge: hypothesising that the point of the concept of 
knowledge is to ﬂag good informants, he asks what properties a cost-eﬀective 
concept rendering us sensitive to the presence of good informants would pick out. 
These indicator properties—having a good track record, being able to oﬀer a 
 
2 See Fricker [2016].  
3 An account of how concepts might be individuated in terms of their common origins is 
Sainsbury and Tye’s originalism about concepts [2012]. 
4  See Queloz [Forthcoming] for a discussion of the relation between paradigm-based 
explanation and genealogical explanation in this vein. 
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justiﬁcation, standing in the right causal relation to the relevant state of aﬀairs, etc.—
turn out to map neatly onto the various conceptions of the concept of knowledge 
that have been advocated in the literature. Each conception, though wrongly taking 
itself to be exhaustive, latches onto a real aspect of our concept of knowledge which 
pluralistically combines all of these aspects in orderly fashion and for good reason: 
each aspect helps us pick out properties which typically indicate the presence of a 
good informant (or can be understood as deriving from that root concern by 
complicating the story a little). 
 Similarly, Fricker shows how disparate conceptions of forgiveness latch onto real 
features of the same practice. The plurality is uniﬁed by an overarching purpose and 
ordered around a paradigm case: Moral Justice Forgiveness. This paradigm-based 
explanation, which explains what needs forgiveness answers to and why it does so 
in a plurality of ways, is what gives Fricker’s account ‘more explanatory musculature 
than any mere acknowledgement of plurality could hope to build’ [Forthcoming: 
XX].5 
 Adopting this point-based way of individuating conceptual practices need not 
mean that one elides the diﬀerence between Moral Justice Forgiveness and Gifted 
Forgiveness. Sometimes, as Ruth Millikan has pointed out, what counts as the same 
is what accomplishes the same, while sometimes, what counts as the same is what 
accomplishes the same by the same means: 
 
5 In contrast to Craig and Williams who present something as practically necessary, Fricker 
exploits a Strawsonian ‘“humanly necessary” kind of necessity,’ presenting the paradigm 
case of forgiveness as necessary in virtue of our ‘human emotional nature’ [Forthcoming: 
XX]. But how far does this contrast go? Must her claim not be that the practice of 
forgiveness is practically necessary in virtue of reactive attitudes that are humanly 
necessary?  
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Let us suppose, for example, that you tie your shoes by looping one lace into 
a bow, encircling it with the other, and pulling through, while I tie my shoes 
by looping each lace separately, then tying them together. The results that 
we get will be exactly the same, but do we exercise the same ability? [2000: 
11] 
Both have accomplished the same thing—tying their shoes—and have in that sense 
exercised the same ability. But they have accomplished it by diﬀerent means, and 
have in that sense exercised diﬀerent abilities. Millikan’s suggestion is that this 
example yields a useful model for one application of the concept/conception 
distinction, and this also seems helpful in thinking about Fricker’s account: Moral 
Justice Forgiveness and Gifted Forgiveness accomplish the same, thus warranting 
being brought under a single concept; but they accomplish the same by diﬀerent 
means, thus explaining why the practice of forgiveness gave rise to diﬀerent 
conceptions of forgiveness. 
 
2. Identifying a Paradigm Case 
How does one identify a paradigm case? For Fricker, it is clear that Moral Justice 
Forgiveness is the paradigm and Gifted Forgiveness the derivate. Indeed, she 
presents one as ‘hermeneutically parasitic’ on the other—we can only make sense of 
the former against the background of the latter. Yet this choice of paradigm was 
quick to attract dissent. In ‘The Priority of Gifted Forgiveness’ [Forthcoming: XX], 
Lucy Allais argues that Gifted Forgiveness is the paradigm and Moral Justice 
Forgiveness the derivate. 
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 The risk is that disagreement over what is to count as the paradigm ends up 
reproducing precisely the schisms that paradigm-based explanation was meant to 
overcome. Factious debates over whether this or that deﬁnition captures the essence 
of a conceptual practice will have been transposed into debates over whether this or 
that form of a practice is its paradigm case. 
 The way to avoid this recreation of schisms, I suggest, is to take seriously the idea 
that what counts as paradigm is partly determined by our purposes in giving the 
paradigm-based explanation, and particularly by what aspect of the practice one is 
trying to bring out. Fricker’s purpose in giving her explanation is to bring out the 
way in which forgiveness frees us of redundant blame-feeling in ways that remedy 
some of the deﬁciencies of blame. Allais’ purpose, by contrast, is to bring out the 
importance of forgiveness as an expression of one’s willingness to interpret each 
other’s actions in more charitable or optimistic terms than they obviously deserve, a 
willingness fuelled by attitudes (of generosity, trust, and love) that ﬂawed human 
beings depend on if they are to live together and take occasional missteps in their 
stride. Once we see that these purposes do not conﬂict, we can recognise that the 
explanations need not conﬂict either (as long as the relevant functions are broadly 
co-executable). Each explanation highlights diﬀerent aspects of forgiveness, diﬀerent 
respects in which the eﬀects that forgiveness tends to have tie in with human needs. 
 Not only is Fricker’s identiﬁcation of a paradigm guided by her functional 
hypothesis about forgiveness, therefore; the paradigm’s claim to being the paradigm 
is inseparable from the functional hypothesis. What counts as paradigm depends on 
the functional hypothesis that animates the paradigm-based explanation. 
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 To take the question at issue between Fricker and Allais to be ‘What is the 
paradigm case of forgiveness?’ is thus to ignore a crucial parameter. Something is a 
paradigm only insofar as it paradigmatically exempliﬁes a function. This is what 
makes a paradigm explanatorily basic: it is basic in virtue of being paradigmatic of 
the function that the explanation draws on in individuating the practice and in 
accounting for its having been found worth cultivating. But in relation to other 
functions the practice might also perform, other cases will emerge as basic and 
paradigmatic. Given that Fricker and Allais seek to illustrate diﬀerent functional 
hypotheses, it is no surprise that they diﬀer in their assessment of what is 
paradigmatic and what is derivative. They are not so much disagreeing as at cross 
purposes—helpfully so, however, since it is by exploring to what extent a conceptual 
practice can be organised around diﬀerent overarching purposes that we work 
towards a comprehensive grasp of the many purposes it serves.6 
 
3. Dependence Claims and the Wider Applicability of the Method 
There is, however, real disagreement between Fricker and Allais in at least one 
regard, namely over whether Gifted Forgiveness is hermeneutically parasitic on 
Moral Justice Forgiveness. According to Fricker, the moral meaning and value of 
Gifted Forgiveness is conceptually dependent on Moral Justice Forgiveness, just as 
the meaning and value of giving away something for free is conceptually dependent 
 
6 Here also Fricker’s notion of an ordered pluralism proves helpful, because one criterion 
by which to assess the viability of a functional hypothesis is the extent to which it brings 
order into the plurality. Of course this then still leaves the question of how the many 
functions relate to each other. As I have argued elsewhere [Queloz Forthcoming, 
Manuscript], that may be where an integrative master model—for instance in the form of a 
genealogical model—is required to explain which functions are prior to which, and why 
they differentiated into a plurality of functions in the way they did. 
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on its being something one normally has to pay for. The ‘shock of gratuitous 
generosity from someone you have wronged’ can sometimes ‘exert more 
transformative motivational power than the negative aﬀect involved in the moral 
demand for remorse’ [Forthcoming: XX], but it is only against the background of 
the expectation that forgiveness needs to be earned that granting it gratuitously can 
come as a shock. Hence, Moral Justice Forgiveness is not just explanatorily prior, but 
also conceptually prior to Gifted Forgiveness, which Fricker takes to suggest that it 
is genetically prior as well. This conceptual priority claim is stronger than the 
explanatory priority claim; to resist it, Allais has to maintain that Gifted Forgiveness 
can be made sense of independently of Moral Justice Forgiveness. Allais’ line is that 
the relevant contrast foil which bestows meaning and value on Gifted Forgiveness is 
not primarily Moral Justice Forgiveness, but the unforgiving default view of 
wrongdoers that their actions warrant according to our moral book-keeping 
[Forthcoming: XX]. 
 Towards the end of her article, however, Fricker makes an even stronger priority 
claim, to the eﬀect that forgiveness must fulﬁl its most basic function before it can 
fulﬁl any other function: the forgiver’s liberation from blame-feeling is ‘the 
condition of any further liberations or values that may ﬂow from it’—the ‘various 
good things that forgiveness may do for us are all dependent upon the prior 
fulﬁlment’ [Forthcoming: XX] of that most basic function. Other functions which 
forgiveness has been taken to serve, such as restoring relationships, can only be 
served by expunging redundant blame-feeling. Her justiﬁcation for saying this is 
that ‘expunging non-redundant blame-feeling could only be premature’ 
[Forthcoming: XX]. 
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 This is not a claim about conceptual dependence; one way to hear it is as a claim 
about functional dependence: fulﬁlling one function is a causal precondition of 
fulﬁlling others. But if the claim is that a token of forgiveness could only restore a 
relationship on the precondition that it also liberated the forgiver from redundant 
blame-feeling—which seems the intended reading—the claim is surely too strong. 
A token of forgiveness can restore a relationship even when it fails to liberate the 
forgiver from redundant blame-feeling. It is true that, relative to the function which 
Fricker regards as prior, forgiveness would then be premature and to that extent 
unjustiﬁed. But sometimes, restoring the relationship is simply more important, and 
fulﬁlling one function at the cost of failing to fulﬁl another will be a price worth 
paying. It remains unclear why there would be a functional dependence here to stop 
one. 
 But perhaps this dependence claim should be heard in a normative rather than a 
functional key, as the claim that one can only properly or justiﬁably restore a 
relationship through forgiveness on the condition that one thereby liberate the 
forgiver from redundant blame-feeling. This would make the discharge of that 
particular function into a normative precondition, i.e. a necessary condition for acts 
of forgiveness to be justiﬁed. But it also remains unclear why we should accept this, 
not least since Fricker writes that she does not want ‘to encourage the idea that the 
most important or most valuable thing that forgiveness does is to be found in its 
most basic role; not at all’; ‘Forgiveness,’ she continues, ‘serves a family of purposes 
or functions, and the question of the relative value of this or that function remains 
an open question’ [Forthcoming: XX]. Indeed; so how does Fricker end up with the 
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conclusion that the beneﬁts of forgiveness are dependent on the prior fulﬁlment of 
its basic point? 
 I suspect that the explanation has to do with one of the insights that powers her 
ordered pluralism, namely that in light of the paradigm case, something very like 
what she regards as the normative precondition of Moral Justice Forgiveness—the 
wrongdoer’s remorseful alignment with the moral understanding of the blamer—
can also be discerned in other types of forgiveness: in Proleptic Gifted Forgiveness, 
remorseful alignment becomes a hoped-for eﬀect which retroactively justiﬁes the act 
of forgiveness; in Distributed Gifted Forgiveness, alignment is a normative 
precondition of forgiveness, but is neither remorseful nor the wrongdoer’s—it is the 
alignment of the moral community with the blamer’s moral understanding. The same 
point is being served in these cases and similar elements are at work, albeit in 
displaced and slightly altered forms. Hence Fricker’s conclusion that ‘[w]hat we have 
seen … is the continued presence of the normative precondition in deceptively 
concealed form’ [Forthcoming: XX]. 
 But deceptive concealment does not leave the normative precondition unaltered: 
in Proleptic Gifted Forgiveness, it changes from something that is a normative 
precondition into something that is not a normative precondition, but rather a post 
hoc justiﬁcation; and in Distributed Gifted Forgiveness, the content of the 
precondition itself changes, substituting the community for the wrongdoer. 
Consequently, it does not follow that what is a normative precondition for Moral 
Justice Forgiveness is also a normative precondition for Gifted Forgiveness. And 
even if it did follow, this would still not yield the conclusion (read as a claim about 
the normative precondition for forgiveness) that the delivery of other beneﬁts of 
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forgiveness depends on the prior fulﬁlment of its basic function. This would require 
the relevant normative precondition to be that the blamer be liberated from 
redundant blame-feeling, and while this might be an eﬀect of the fulﬁlment of the 
normative preconditions at work in diﬀerent forms of forgiveness, none of those 
preconditions has that as its content. 
 Are these dependence claims essential to ordered pluralism? Do derivative forms 
of a paradigm have to stand to it in relations of conceptual, functional, or normative 
dependence in order to count as having been integrated into an ordered pluralism? 
By separating incidental from essential features of Fricker’s method, we gain a better 
sense not just of what the method is, but also of whether it might be generalised to 
practices other than forgiveness. 
 Our reconstruction suggests that what brings order into the plurality is the point 
of forgiveness, and the way in which seemingly disparate forms of forgiveness can 
be shown to serve that same point in diﬀerent ways. The various dependence claims 
are not essential to this, and are indeed absent from Craig’s and Williams’s accounts. 
These dependence claims are best seen as particular instances of the connections that 
might be revealed by ordering various forms of a practice around the beacon of a 
paradigm case. Being hermeneutically parasitic is just one example of a particularly 
close relation between derivative and paradigm. The relations between diﬀerent 
forms of a practice might also be rendered intelligible and orderly in diﬀerent ways: 
interdependent forms of a practice might co-emerge, or independent forms might 
turn out to diﬀer in systematic ways in order to preserve the same functionality 
across varying contexts of application. 
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 The only priority claim that is essential to the method is the claim to explanatory 
priority made on behalf of the paradigm case. Yet even this claim is, as we saw, 
relative to one’s purposes in giving the explanation. The method can therefore travel 
lightly and easily from one subject matter to another: lightly because it makes few 
presuppositions, and easily because it can ﬂexibly adapt itself to the concerns of 
those who deploy it. This suggests that it holds great promise as a method by which 
to integrate rival conceptions of conceptual practices more widely. 
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